The Violence and Hiddenness of Messages Pt. II

March 23, 2007

Tony, I realize in reading your response that you provocatively went in a direction I was not intending. This, in itself, I think demonstrates the break between what is sent and what is received. It is the absence of a universal discourse/medium, the singularity of our identities, the uniqueness of our context, etc. which precludes the guarantee of receiving any particular message. However, in my initial post, I was not thinking about the way in which transubjective discourses supply meanings to messages which the individual (of modernity) cannot defy. I love this thought! I think you are entirely correct on this point. Your point is important because as you say the individual is “always already” bound up with her context/community.

I had two intended meanings of my last post:

1) the “hiddenness” or “concealment” of meaning (Heidegger) is an ontological fact, not just a function of what is supplied by a given context/ community. There is an inherent finitude/provisional quality to the disclosure of meaning which stands against the essential meaning of Platonism/transcendental idealism, etc. There is never any “full,” “complete,” or “essential” disclosure–only the provisional kind. This is not just the case because we are always “in community” but because we are always “in time.” Heidegger had a great interest in why human beings forget the essential hiddenness of meaning.

2) I was thinking of particular situations in which individuals find themselves committed to a meaning/direction/trajectory that in some fundamental way offends the ethical/ontological logic of the polis (I’m especially thinking of the ethical.) Although, transubjective discourses have already inevitably supplied meaning to the outsider’s position, I don’t know that I agree that these discourses create it. Certainly the discursive and institutional structures shape the formation of “alternative” positions but I still very much hold a space for the human imagination, courage, vision, and other virtues which “the system” cannot produce.

I am interested in situations where the figure of the revolutionary/prophet defies the dominating logic. Can we rightfully understand the turn against a subjugating communal logic to be violent itself? Is this “turn against” more violent than an “appeal to”? How does one navigate the situation of holding a position which is fundamentally different from a more pervasively accepted one? These procedural/methodological questions about how we mediate disagreement are becoming very important for me and are leading me toward Habermas. This, I think, is especially significant given your contention that “the system” is always producing identities/logics which stand outside of its normative, subjugating logic. How do we engage with these, given their inevitability?

In many ways, I’m starting to like the word “communications” better than “messages” because (for me) it doesn’t have all the problems of what is unsent/sent. “Messages” conveys some intention or expectation of what is to be discerned. Do you agree? But, is this really fair, especially given that the message is by its nature traumatic and always too-much–too-soon? On the other hand, “communications” refers to an exchange, an “event,” or an interplay which is intersubjective. In this way, it creates space for what is sent and unsent (I think.) I think it refers more to movements/gestures among beings rather than signifying something about the specificity of their intentions or meanings.

Posted by MATT Posted in Continental Philosophy, Posts by Matt, Re: Messages